Most Reprinted Works*

  • Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England” (with Douglass C. North). Journal of Economic History. (December 1989) 49: 803-32
    • Reprinted in: Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, eds., Monetary and Fiscal Policy. (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1994);
    • Reprinted in Oliver E. Williamson and Scott E. Masten, eds., Transaction Cost Economics. vol. I. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 1995);
    • Reprinted in Lee J. Alston, Thrainn Eggertsson, and Douglass C. North, eds., Empirical Studies in Institutional Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996);
    • Reprinted in Svetozar Pejovich, ed., The Economics of Property Rights. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001);
    • Reprinted in Colin D. Scott, ed., Regulation (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2003);
    • Reprinted in Claude Menard, The Political Economy of Institutions vol. 6 (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2004);
    • Reprinted in Dewan, Torun, Keith Dowding and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Rational Choice Politics. (London: Sage, 2009);
    • Reprinted in Kevin E. Davis, ed., Institutions and Economic Performance (Edward Elgar, Publishing, forthcoming);
    • Reprinted in Andreas Dahlkvist and Lars Magnusson, eds., Twentieth-Century Economic History: Critical Concepts in Economics (New York: Routledge, forthcoming);
    • Reprinted in Pablo Spiller, ed., Institutional Law and Economics (Edward Elgar, Publishing, forthcoming);
    • Reprinted in Howard R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn, eds., Gunnar Myrdal, Friedrich A. von Hayek, Robert W. Fogel, Douglass C. North and Amartya K. Sen (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2011);
    • Reprinted in Daniel Klerman, ed., Economics of Legal History. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, forthcoming);
    • Reprinted with a new introduction, “Limited Government and Liberal Markets: An Introduction to ‘Constitutions and Commitment,’” in Paul W. Drake and Mathew D. McCubbins, eds., The Origins of Liberty: Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
    • Comment by Bruce G. Carruthers, “Politics, Popery and Property: A Comment on North and Weingast,” Journal of Economic History (Sept. 1990) 50: 693-98.

 

  • The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development.Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (Spring 1995) 11: 1-31.
    • Reprinted/ translated into Spanish as “El papel económico de las instituciones políticas: el federalismo de mercado y el desarrollo económico, in Pablo Beramendi and Ramón Maíz, eds., “Federalismo y Neoinstitutionalismo,” Zona Abierta 104-105 (2003).
    • Reprinted in Peter J. Boettke, ed., The Legacy of Friedrich von Hayek (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004);
    • Reprinted in Stefan Voight, Constitutional Political Economy (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004);
    • Reprinted in Claude Menard, The International Library of the New Institutional Economics (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2005);
    • Reprinted in Bruce H. Kobayashi and Larry E. Ribstein, eds., Economics of Federalism (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2007);
    • Reprinted in Nicholas Mercuro, ed., Law and Economics (Critical Concepts in Law) (Routledge Publishing, 2007);
    • Reprinted in Dewan, Torun, Keith Dowding and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Rational Choice Politics. (London: Sage, 2009);
    • Reprinted in Richard Epstein, ed., The Economics of Constitutional Law. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2010);
    • Reprinted in Pablo T. Spiller, ed., Institutional Law and Economics. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, forthcoming);
    • Reprinted in John Kincaid, ed., Federalism. (SAGE Publications, forthcoming  2010);
    • Reprinted in Peter J. Boettk and Peter T. Leeson, eds., The Economic Role of the State (Edward Elgar, Publishing, forthcoming).

 

  • The Industrial Organization of Congress; or Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Market” (with William J. Marshall), Journal of Political Economy 96 (February 1988): 132-63.
    • Reprinted in Charles K. Rowley, ed., Public Choice Theory. Vol II. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 1993).
    • Reprinted in Oliver E. Williamson and Scott E. Masten, Transaction Cost Economics. vol. I. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 1995).
    • Reprinted in Dennis C. Mueller, The Economics of Politics.  (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2001).
    • Reprinted in Claude Menard, The International Library of the New Institutional Economics vol. 6 (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2004).
    • Reprinted in Dewan, Torun, Keith Dowding and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Rational Choice Politics. (London: Sage, forthcoming 2009).
    • Translated into Spanish in Sebastian M. Saiegh and Mariano Tommasi, eds. La Nueva Economia Politica: Racionalidad e Instituciones. Buenos Aires, EUDEBA, 1998;
    • Translated into Chinese: Ma Jun, Bin, Xiao and Yaping, Liu., eds., Selected Collection of Transactions Cost Politics (Beijing: Chinese RenMin University Press, forthcoming 2008).
    • Reprinted in Pablo T. Spiller, Institutional Law and Economics. (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.)

 

  • Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework For Interpreting Recorded Human History (with Douglass C. North and John Joseph Wallis). (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Paperback version published 2012.
    • Translated into French (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 2010);
    • Translated into Russian (Institute for the Economy in Transition, 2011);
    • Translated into German (Mohr Siebeck Verlag, 2011);
    • Translated into Italian (Bologna, Italy: Societa Editrice Il Mulino SpA;
    • Translated into Chinese, Chapter 5, “The Transition from Limited to Open Access Orders,” Marxism & Reality, 2011, #2.
    • Translated into Chinese (Singapore: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press of Singapore, forthcoming);
    • Translated in Japanese (Tokyo: NTT Publishing, forthcoming);
    • Translated into Arabic (National Center for Translation, forthcoming).

 

  • The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs” (with Paul R. Milgrom and Douglass C. North) Economics and Politics (March 1990) 2: 1-23.
    • Reprinted in Douglas Irwin, ed., Trade in the Pre-Modern Period: 1400-1700. (Edward Elgar, 1996);
    • Reprinted in Daniel Klein, ed., Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1997);
    • Reprinted in Claude Menard, The Political Economy of Institutions vol. 6 (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2004);
    • Reprinted in Lisa Martin, International Institutions in the New Global Economy (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005);
    • Reprinted in Edward Stringham, Anarchy and the Law (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, forthcoming 2006);
    • Reprinted in Eric A. Posner, Social Norms, Nonlegal Sanctions, and the Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007.)

 

  • Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control: Regulatory Policymaking by the FTC” (with Mark J. Moran). Journal of Political Economy 91 (October 1983), pp. 765-800.
    • Reprinted in: Robert Mackay, James C. Miller, and Bruce Yandle (eds.), Public Choice and Regulation: A View from Inside the Federal Trade Commission. (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1987), Ch. 3.
    • Reprinted in Charles K. Rowley, ed., Public Choice Theory. Vol. III. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 1993).
    • Reprinted in Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., The Foundations of Regulatory Economics. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999).
    • Reprinted in part in: Walter Gellhorn, Administrative Law 8th ed. (West Publishing Co.); Gellhorn and Byse, Administrative Law 9th ed. (Foundation Press);
    • Reprinted in Thomas P. Lyon, Regulation (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007).
    • Reprinted in Pablo T. Spiller, Institutional Law and Economics. (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.)
    • Comment by Timothy J. Muris, “Regulatory Policymaking at the Federal Trade Commission: The Extent of Congressional Control.” Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986): pp. 884-89.
    • Reply, “Congress and Regulatory Agency Choice,” Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986), pp. 890-4.

 

  • Commitment, Coordination, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guilds” (with Avner Greif and Paul Milgrom). Journal of Political Economy (1994) 102: 745-76.
    • Reprinted in Jack Knight and Itai Sened, eds. Explaining Social Institutions. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1995);
    • Reprinted in Elias L Khalil, ed., Trust (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003);
    • Reprinted in Claude Menard, The International Library of the New Institutional Economics vol 3. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2004);
    • Reprinted in Eric A. Posner, Social Norms, Nonlegal Sanctions, and the Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007);
    • Reprinted in Dewan, Torun, Keith Dowding and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Rational Choice Politics. (London: Sage, 2009);
    • Reprinted in Lisa Bernstein and Francesco Parisi, eds., Customary Law. (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.)
    • Reprinted in Pablo T. Spiller, Institutional Law and Economics. (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.)

 

  • Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control” (with Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger G. Noll), Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3 (Fall 1987): 243-77.
    • Reprinted in part in Arthur Earl Bonfield and Michael Asimow, Federal and State Administrative Law (West Publishing Co., 1989), pp. 16-18 and 531-35;
    • Reprinted in Paul L. Joskow, ed., Economic Regulation (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2000);
    • Reprinted in Cary Coglianese and Robert Kagan, eds., Regulation and Regulatory Processes (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2007).
    • Reprinted in Susan Rose-Ackerman, ed., The Economics of Administrative Law (Edward Elgar, Publishing, forthcoming).
    • Reprinted in Dewan, Torun, Keith Dowding and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Rational Choice Politics. (London: Sage, 2009).
    • Reprinted in Samuel Kernell and Steven S Smith, eds., Principles and Practice of American Politics: Classic and Contemporary Readings, 5th Edition. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2012.
    • Reprinted in Pablo Spiller, ed., Institutional Law and Economics (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming).

 

  • Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. (1993) 149: 286-311.
    • Reprinted in Stefan Voight, ed., Constitutional Political Economy (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.)
    • Reprinted in Claude Menard, The Political Economy of Institutions vol. 6 (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2004);
    • Translated into Chinese: Ma Jun, Bin, Xiao and Yaping, Liu., eds., Selected Collection of Transactions Cost Politics (Beijing: Chinese RenMin University Press, forthcoming 2008);
    • Reprinted in Rudolf Ritcher and Eric Furubotn, eds., The New Institutional Economics of Markets. (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.)
    • Comment by Peter Bernholz, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. (1993) 149: 312-20.

 

  • Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation,” Published under “McNollgast” (With Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger Noll), Georgetown Law Review (1992) 80: 705-42.
    • Reprinted in Singer, Norman J., ed., Sutherland Statutory Construction. 5th ed. (Deerfield, Illinois: Clark-Boardman-Callaghan. 1992) Volume 3A, pp. 739-762.
    • Reprinted in Singer, Norman J., ed., Sutherland on Contracts and Statutory Construction. 6th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Group, 2000).
    • Reprinted in Sutherland on Contracts and Statutory Construction. 7th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Group, forthcoming).

 

  • The Institutional Foundations Of Committee Power,” (with Kenneth A. Shepsle). American Political Science Review 81 (March 1987), pp. 85-194.
    • Reprinted in Charles K. Rowley, ed., Public Choice Theory. Vol. II. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 1993);
    • Reprinted in Philip Norton, ed., Legislature and Legislators. (Ashgate Publishing, 1998);
    • Reprinted inS teven S. Smith, Jason M. Roberts, and Ryan J. Vander Wielen, eds., The American Congress Reader (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
    • Comment by Keith Krehbiel,  “Controversies,” American Political Science Review 81 (September 1987), pp 929-35.
    • Reply: “Reflections on Committee Power” (with Kenneth A. Shepsle), “Controversies,” American Political Science Review81 (September 1987), pp. 935-45.

     

*Includes reprints, translations, new introductions and afterwards, excerptions, etc.